We like to talk about our unity in diversity, our differences in belief which still allow us one faith, the disagreements which unite us. All those are good things to talk about and they are also true. What we do not like to talk about, and are also true, are the disagreements which separate us, despite our commitment to encompass them in one religion. There are issues which have split churches, lost members, come near to destroying us. In the nineteenth century there were two: institutional social action in the issue of slavery, and theology, when the transcendentalists went head to head with the liberal Christians. Nowadays we have almost come to terms with theological diversity, but we still have problems with institutional social action. But one is enough to wound us deeply, even fatally, unless we understand precisely what the differences are between us as well as what we have in common, and try to avoid the misunderstandings, accusations, and foolishnesses that confuse the real issues. There really are two separate issues involved in the question of church social action, and though they have little in common with one another, we often fail to distinguish them, using one to argue the other, and therefore fail either to make ourselves clear in our arguments or to begin to find a path for understanding others' point of view.
The first issue is the separation of church and state. It is a constitutional issue and a political one which might have little to do with our religious passions and prejudices except that it becomes a moral and ethical argument rather than a political one. Until the Age of Reason it would have occurred to no one that such a governmental set-up could exist. Government and religion were one and the same. During the reformation, it was sufficient at first merely to accuse a nation of Protestantism to justify its invasion by the forces of other nations, and rulers ruthlessly stamped out practitioners of a different faith than theirs. A compromise was finally reached, and it was decided that a people should be allowed to worship as their ruler pleased. In order to worship as you wished, if it conflicted with the ruler's religion, the only thing to do was to emigrate to a country whose prince was in agreement with you, or to an entirely new land where you could set up your own state religion. It never occurred to anyone that religion was not the business of government, or, equally, that government was not the business of religion. It is somewhat amazing that given the 6000 years of human civilization that differed with such an idea, in 250 years the notion of the separation of church and state has become not only political but religious dogma.
That I call it dogma does not mean that I disagree with it, mind you, only that I would argue that things are said and done under that rubric which perhaps do not fit with its origin and yet are justified by it and accepted almost unthinkingly by its followers. The same people who say that economic and political systems that many citizens of this country hold as dogma may not fit other nations and should not be held as a standard are often the same ones who cannot swallow their indignation over national religions such as in Iran and Israel. I don't like their governments' behavior either, by the way, and I agree that it is partly because they are shaped by religious dogma. I just think we ought to be aware of the contradictions in our thinking.
Anyway, about our own separation of church and state, guaranteed in our Constitution in these words: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... The framers of the Constitution were products of the enlightenment, and influenced by the Scottish philosophers and the French rationalists, as well as remembering the history of our country which was colonized partly by people escaping from the established religion of their parent countries. They wished to avoid coercion either of or by religion. They did not want the government coerced by religion nor the people's religion coerced by the government. Therefore they said that the government would not establish an official religion nor would it prohibit the free practice of any religion.
I think I can assume that we all agree that social action is one natural result of a religious commitment, and that the only argument is whether it can be done as part of the institutional life of a church or whether it must be done only as an individual expression of religious conviction. I know without any doubt that a commitment to justice, mercy and compassion which translates into an effort to make ourselves and our society more just, merciful and compassionate must be such a result, or the religion itself is invalid or at best tragically incomplete.
Since religion requires social action, and since the fundamental law of our land requires the separation of church and state, how can these things be reconciled? This really is the statement of the first issue of the argument that we have among ourselves about institutional social action. I think that sounds a lot more significant than it really is. I don't believe that it is a real issue in most of the social action that churches wish to take, even the social action which includes lobbying members of congress, political protests, civil disobedience, mass demonstrations and so forth. It is only significant when the action the church is taking is in order to persuade the government to establish a religious practice such as prayer in the schools or the outlawing of birth control or abortions. (These last seemingly civil matters are religious when they are the dogma of religious associations and not of the wider society, and therefore do become an issue of the separation of church and state.) When what the church is attempting to change in the society is moral and ethical rather than theological, it seems to me that the argument really does not apply. As long as it is in the government's province to make the rules, and the churches can only try to influence how it makes them without any inherent power to do so except moral suasion, no matter how organized and enthusiastic, it is not a problem. In the nature of religion as a force for social change, its free exercise requires the possibility of social action as an institution. It is the government's duty not only not to establish a religion as being able to take over the power to make the civil rules, but not to allow one to assume such power. It is our duty as citizens in a democratic society to make sure that the government does its duty in that regard.
It seems to me that the second issue that we argue about when we think of social action has much more substance than the first. That is whether an institution can presume to speak for its members -- particularly an institution such as ours which is founded on the authority of the individual, and in which we formally agree to disagree. Other religious institutions whose authority is unitary may make those kinds of decisions for their members, but we affirm the democratic process not only in our society, but in our religious societies and in their association.
The danger in democracy is the tyranny of the majority. There is nothing in most church bylaws -- there is nothing in our church bylaws -- to keep a bare majority from making decisions regarding the social action stance of the entire church. If, for instance, to take the most ludicrous example I can imagine, 51% of our members decided to pass a resolution with action directives to lobby for the passage of a constitutional amendment requiring the teaching of creationism in the public schools, the other 49% could not keep that from happening, and the board would be required to implement the resolution. The only recourse of the minority would be to allow their church to speak for them as if they agreed or to leave, in which case, of course, the resolution would be speaking in the united voice of the church. It would simply be a much smaller church.
A more real possibility, though this is no longer fashionable as it was some years ago, is that members of a church might decide to have the church declared a nuclear free zone. Many UU churches have, as has the headquarters in Boston. I suspect that that would have far more than a simple majority in its favor, but I, for one, would be opposed, not because I am in favor of nuclear weapons -- I am utterly opposed to them -- but because I think it is an empty gesture leaving us open to a certain amount of ridicule. The number of nuclear weapons likely to be based in or transported through one of our churches is quite small. The number of people whose attitude toward nuclear weapons will be changed by such action is nearly if not precisely equivalent to that, and the number of those who will even notice it is not much larger. Nevertheless, there are many people whom I admire, love and often agree with, who have thought it not only worthwhile and courageous but even necessary to make such a gesture. How do we reconcile my embarrassment with their commitment? And how can they legitimately say that they speak for me?
They can't, of course, and yet there is a real need for an institutional response to the religious commitment to action on a social issue. There is a terrible frustration among those to whom their religion has been teaching something very clearly which it will not act upon nor allow them to act upon in its name. There have been several efforts made to find a middle road which will satisfy everyone, and of course it satisfies no one. The most common, and probably best, one is to establish a social action committee in which the social activists are allowed to be active as they wish in the name not of the church but of the church's committee. People outside the church cannot ascertain the difference, but legalisms are satisfied, though even fewer than a majority are actually involved in making the decisions.
Probably the plan that distresses the fewest people is to set up a committee that acts as a clearing house rather than an action committee itself, keeps people informed on social issues, and encourages them to respond as individuals. The frustrations there, of course, are that you lose any power that acting as a member of a larger body may give you, and if the committee takes its work seriously as a clearing house you will spend all your time listening to possible arenas for action rather than acting.
These are some of the ways we deal with the difficulty of social action as a single religious institution. Some would say the impossibility, but I would not. I think that there are some things which spring so naturally from our definition of ourselves as a religious institution that we can act as one and speak as one in the civil arena. However, we must be very careful how we decide what those issues are, and what we are to do with them.
First, I think it is very important that they have a very clear religious base, one that can be articulated and that is very much a part of who we are. Then it is clearly necessary that they be supported not by majority, but by consensus. One reason for the power of the Friends' social action is that they do nothing until all are in agreement. Sometimes getting that agreement is a long and painful process, but nothing is done until it is obtained. I do not say that we must go to such lengths as that, but certainly if one of our churches does decide on some kind of public social action, any disagreement with the institutional position should be aired and publicized.
Those of us who remember the 70s when our faith's numbers were halved and the association nearly went bankrupt because of our quarrels over social issues are very nervous about any controversial action as an institution. However, sometimes it seems that something arises so clearly based in our religious identity that we all wish to rise up to use our power as a religious community, to speak as one voice, to act as a moral institution. I believe that those times come, and that a framework should be in place to enable us to deal with them when they do. Until they do, though our religion will spur us to individual action, and the institution should help that to happen, we can only act as a community when the community wills to act, and to rush into action without that will expressed, explicit and united, will harm our fellowship and oppress those among us who do not share our conventional political wisdom.